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COMMENTS
PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND PUBLIC INTEREST:
COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL RECORDS
Joan Uda
Systematic recordation and dissemination of information about in-
dividuals is a form of surveillance and control which may easily in-
hibit freedom to speak, to work, and to move about in this land. If
information available to Government is misused to publicize past
incidents in the lives of its citizens the pressures for conformity
will be irresistible. Initiative and individuality can be suffocated and
a resulting dullness of mind and conduct will become the norm....
The present controversy ... must be viewed in this broadest context.
In short, the overwhelming power of the . . .Government must be
held in proper check.1
INTRODUCTION
We in Montana, like the rest of our world, have entered an era
of disturbing and unprecedented capacity for data gathering, storage,
processing, and dissemination. We owe this abundance to computer tech-
nology, the implications of which have not been lost upon government
or private enterprise. According to Senator Sam Ervin, Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and Senate leader
in the fight for "data privacy," the federal government alone has over
900 computer banks,2 containing information about tens of millions of
private citizens. Commercial enterprise is keeping pace: for example,
the Atlanta-based Retail Credit Company, which is in the business of
supplying credit information, has files on more than forty-five million
people, obtained by a staff of seven thousand investigators.
Montana is currently faced with an extremely important computer
question: whether or not to establish a computerized criminal data sys-
tem, which will eventually be interfaced with other similar state and
federal systems, At present Montana has no such system; criminal rec-
ord data is kept by the Montana Department of Justice's Identification
'Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718, 726 (D.D.C. 1971).
'In 120 CONG. REC. S 1295-96 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974), Senator Sam Irvin gave a
figure of "over 800". On a subsequent N.B.C. news special in the spring of 1974,
he said there were 910 federal comuterized data banks.
8A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 69
(1971) [hereinafter cited as MILLER]. Miller notes that these investigators interview
''employers, former employers, references, fellow club members, neighbors and former
neighbors [and] financial professional people," and that much of the information
they elicit is univified and little better than gossip.
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 82A-1202(1) (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
1947], abolished Montana's earlier State Bureau of Criminal Identification and
Investigation and transferred its functions to the Department of Justice. These
functions are set out in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 80-2002 to 80-2006, including (1) main-
taining records of identification information such as fingerprints, photographs, and
descriptions, on "all persons . . . convicted of a felony within the state, and of
other well-known and habitual criminals," § 80-2002; (2) notifying local law en-
forcement agencies if a particular subject on whom it receives information is a
1
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Bureau,4 which, though tied into a teletype network, operates only
manual files. 5
Much of the impetus to form an extensive interstate criminal data
system comes from the federal government, through the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (L.E.A.A.), which was established within
the United States Department of Justice to administer funds made avail-
able by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.6 The
Montana Board of Crime Control, which administers L.E.A.A. funds
within Montana,7 has appointed a Security and Privacy Task Force to
study the security and privacy issues raised by such systems and to draft
Montana legislation on the subject.
Montana is thus presented with a set of difficult decisions involving
both policy and implementation. These decisions, because of their ulti-
mate social impact, must receive our most thoughtful attention. This
comment will explore some of the decisions to be made, with an eye to
the competing interests of privacy and law enforcement, and will sug-
gest some possible solutions.
PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS: THE LARGER CONTEXT
Privacy is, in the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, "the right to be let
alone."'8 In his famous dissent to Olmstead v. United States, he said:
The makers of our Constitution . . .recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.... They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
fugitive, § 80-2003; and (3) cooperating "with identification bureaus in other states
and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop and carry on a complete
interstate and international system of criminal identification and investigation,"
§ 80-2005. Apparently the only information which law enforcement officers are
under a statutory duty to transmit to the Bureau are fingerprints of a person
arrested for a felony, § 80-2003; and the only penalty for failure to comply is that
the offending officer's salary may be withheld until the information is transmitted.
§ 80-2004. Upon a finding of innocence, the arrestee's fingerprints and description
are to be destroyed. § 80-2003. There seems to be no penalty for violation of this
provision.
According to David Clouse, Acting Bureau Chief, Montana badly needs manda-
tory reporting provisions, including dispositions, with strict penalties for violations.
Apparently fewer than 20 percent of the Bureau's arrest records contain dispositions,
because information is entered into the Bureau's files only upon receipt of finger-
print cards. Unless the subject pleads guilty or entry is delayed until after disposi-
tion, the original entry will not contain the disposition; and the local law enforce-
ment agencies rarely follow up with another fingerprint card to enter the disposition.
The Bureau has no power to require this followup. Telephone Conversation with
David Clouse, Oct. 11, 1974.
6Telephone Conversation with David Clouse, Oct. 28, 1974.
6Act of June 19, 1968, pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
'The Crime Board has been designated by the governor as the "state planning
agency" under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and must
"perform the functions assigned to it under the act." R.C.M. 1947, § 82A-1207(4).
Relevant federal provisions may be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3721 to 3738 (1970), Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, Subehapters II and III.
8Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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emotions and their sensations. They conferred as against the govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.
Mr. Justice Douglas has expressed the relationship between privacy
and individual freedom most succinctly: "The right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom." 10
There is increasing concern about the proliferation of data and its
impact upon privacy and personal liberty. The cybernetic revolution
poses particular threats because huge masses of data create the pos-
sibility of large-scale social control and also promote individual docility.
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for
the record, each containing a number of questions. . . . There are
thus hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions
of threads in all. . . . They are not visible, they are not material,
but every man is constantly aware of their existence [and] natural-
ly develops a respect for the people who manipulate the threads."
Professor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School, one of the
country's foremost experts on computers and privacy, characterizes the
pulling together of these threads as a "record prison"--a "womb to tomb
dossier" on every American, which can be made available nationwide to
undetermined and virtually uncontrolled data users.12 In 1971 Miller
estimated that there were more than 60,000 computers in the United
States,1 3 noting that "laser technology already makes it feasible to store
a twenty-page dossier on every American on a piece of tape that is less
than five thousand feet long.'
14
This computer capacity led Miller to the concept of "record prisons"
because the computer never forgets and never forgives. There is, in Chris-
tian terms, no possibility of redemption. In a computer record society,
a person has no latitude for youthful or careless mistakes,' 5 no room for
personal eccentricity,' 6 and will ultimately learn to keep his mouth shut
and his protests to himself,'7 lest the computer learn and tell.
OId. at 478-79.
1"Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
"A. SOLZYHENITSYN, CANCER WARD, as read into the Congressional Record by Senator
Sam Ervin, supra note 2 at § 1295.
"MILLER, supra note 3 at 39.
lId. at 10.
"Id. at 12.
"5See generally MnLLER, supra note 3 at 105-122 (section entitled "The Little Red
Schoolhouse Goes Electric"), and Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records
of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 147,
168-78 (1966).
'"Miller notes that congressional hearings on credit companies uncovered many files
containing remarks from anonymous sources such as ''peculiar,'' ''scatter-brained,''
'neurotic," and "psychotic," with no apparent medical or psychiatric foundation.
'Other files included remarks about the subject's drinking, aggressiveness, ethics,
associations, health, hobbies, and activities." Miller suggests that it is very likely
that personal antagonisms and prejudices greatly influence the contents of these
files. MILLER, supra note 3 at 70.
17See United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (civil rights workers
arrested and convicted in effort to disrupt a voter registration drive); Hughes v.
[Vol. 36
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Every person has a need for privacy-for personal space in which
to relax, to explore, to grow.'8 All of us seek moments in which we
"let down our hair," are "off the record"-moments when we wish to
be free from the prying of those who seek to evaluate who and what
we are. Computerization means that we may be constantly evaluated by
persons who never meet us, strangers to whom we are nothing more than
isolated facts on a computer print-out. Those facts may be inaccurate,
incomplete, stale-and we most often are unaware that the record exists.
Thus, we may become locked in Miller's "record prison," where a col-
lection of facts, perhaps accurate, perhaps not, becomes the sum of our
lives.
Sensitivity to this problem leads to a definition of privacy as the
right to control the flow of information about one's self. According to
Miller:
The basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individ-
ual's ability to control the circulation of information relating to
him-a power that often is essential to maintaining social relation-
ships and personal freedom."
Government has, of course, been keeping manual records for years,
and these are also susceptible to abuse. But computerization presents
problems of enormously greater magnitude. First, computerization al-
lows collection of great quantities of personal data that was too expen-
sive and time-consuming to collect under a manual system. What was
not collected could not be disseminated. Second, manual systems were
kept mostly on a decentralized basis and were widely scattered. Com-
puter capacity allows virtually instantaneous centralization and dissem-
ination. Third, information in manual systems has typically been quite
superficial and often so out of date as to be virtually useless. Computers
allow instant updating and cross-referencing from many sources of data.
Fourth, it has been difficult to obtain access to much available infor-
mation, since this often involved a search of bulky files and voluminous,
isolated records. A computer system puts such data at one's fingertips
in a matter of seconds from a remote access terminal. Fifth, Americans
have become increasingly mobile, making them difficult to keep track of.
Computer systems using universal identifiers make it possible to track
everyone from the crade to the grave. Finally, in manual systems, insuf-
ficient data have been available to allow most people to interpret and
infer revealing information about the data subjects. Computers make
Rizzo, 282 F.Supp. 881 (E.D.Pa. 1968) (police harrassment of "hippies" to keep
them from congregating in a public park, by making mass arrests with no intention
of filing charges against them); United States v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968 (D.P.R.
1967) (individual refused to step forward for induction on advice of counsel under
agreement with the U.S. Attorney that no action would be taken; individual was
immediately arrested, though he explained that other judicial proceedings were pend-
ing).
'See generally A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-22 (1967).
"MILLER, supra note 3 at 25.
1975]
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interpretation much easier by amassing great amount of personally
identifiable data.20
The Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has files containing "rap sheets" 2' 1 or fingerprint cards on more than
twenty million persons. 22 The Defense Department keeps industrial se-
curity files, including sensitive personal information, on more than a
million and a half individuals. 23 Huge amounts of sensitive personal data
are contained in income tax, census, and social security files.2 4 This
information is not invariably confidential.
25
In the mid-1960's Congress and privacy-minded citizens rebelled
against the creation of a National Data Center, which was intended to
centralize the statistical information gathering and processing of many
federal agencies and departments.2 6 Opponents feared that the persons
who would be responsible for its creation and administration were largely
insensitive to its impact on privacy and freedom. It was potentially, a
huge dossier-system on virtually every American. 27 More recently, the
General Services Administration requested $200,000,000 to set up a
computer network, "FEDNET," to be shared by numerous federal agen-
cies. Last July Congress refused to allow GSA funds to be used for
"FEDNET. 2 8 In the meantime, a number of federal agencies, depart-
ments, and bureaus are using time-sharing computer systems, 29 indicat-
ing that, for the data-hungry federal bureaucrat at least, where there's
a will, there's a method.
OtId. at 26.
MA "rap sheet" is an individual's criminal record. Exact contents vary from agency
to agency, but at minimum it contains arrests and charges and sometimes dispositions.
12120 CONG. REC. S 1295 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974). The Division has data on approxi-
mately sixty million arrests involving about nineteen million people and has about
two hundred million sets of fingerprints on file. Menard, supra note 1 at 721.
2120 CONG. REC. S 1295 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974).
2'MILLER, supra note 3 at 82, 131, 145 (income tax); 126-141 (census); 60-61 (social
security).
'Willer notes that the Internal Revenue Service has sold ''aggregate income statistics
about taxpayers broken down by Zip Code Number." Id. at 82. He also documents
extensive transfers of information among federal, state, and local government agen-
cies, id. at 146-152 and among federal agencies, id. at 141-145. Miller also points
out "the informational backscratching" that exists in a number of areas, including
law enforcement and corporate security.
Every sizable company, particularly those engaged in work for the government,
maintains dossiers on large numbers of people . . .The total must be staggering
... Because of their similarity in background and common interests, an informal,
but effective, information transfer network exists among industry security offi-
cers and all segments of the law-enforcement fraternity. Thus, a security man
man with a grudge (or for a price) probably can blackball someone and limit
his ability to gain employment. Ironically, in one case of this type . . . the
individual excluded from the job market had been both a law-enforcement and
a corporate-security man himself for many years.
id. at 149.
"MILLER, supra note 3 at 56-57.
211d. at 56-59.
H.R. 15544, as amended July 31, 1974, Title IV, See. 3.
MLLER, supra note 3 at 60.
[Vol. 36
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PRIVACY AND COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL DATA
Computerization of personally identifiable criminal data shares all
the problems associated with computerization of any personal data. It
also presents some unique problems because of its extreme sensitivity
and the destructive personal consequences when such data is misused.
On the other hand, there is no question that computerization has
been a great boon to law enforcement. For example, a Missoula, Mon-
tana, patrolman in a radio car can have an N.C.I.C. 30 check run on a
possible stolen vehicle in a matter of seconds. He can also very quickly
determine if there is an out-of-state "want" on a particular individual.
31
In a society annually appalled by a rise in serious crime rates, it is diffi-
cult to argue with any means which offers more effective crime pre-
vention and detection.32
One area of increasing controversy is the use of arrest records,
particularly raw arrest records which contain no dispositions,33 and
arrest records of persons who have been acquitted or against whom
charges have been dismissed.34
In the United States, an ancient precept of criminal law is that a
person is innocent until proven guilty. As noted by the Washington
State court of appeals:
Few things have been as basic to our legal system as the presump-
tion of innocence, until proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
fact, the very word acquittal is defined to mean "judicially dis-
charged from an accusation, . . . charge, or suspicion of guilt."
... An arrest . .. proves nothing so far as the actual conduct of
the person arrested .... [O]nly a conviction carries legal signifi-
cance as to a person's involvement in criminal behavior.'
National Crime Information Center, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [here-
inafter referred to as N.C.1.C.]. N.C.I.C. contains information on stolen property
and persons with outstanding arrest warrants. By 1971 about three thousand remote
access terminals connected local law enforcement agencies with N.C.I.C.. About one-
third tie in directly to the FBI's computers, and the other two-thirds tie in to state
computer systems that have access to N.C.I.C. Id at 147.
81id.
'There is no doubt that computerization offers much help. See PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68-70 (1967).
'About thirty-five percent of the FBI's arrest records do not contain dispositions.
Id. at 76. See discussion concerning Montana, supra note 4.
'The controversy is highlighted by the increasing law review attention to the subject.
The following is merely a sampling: Comment, The Expungement or Restriction of
Arrest Records, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123 (1974); Comment, Arrest Records-Protect-
ing the Innocent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1974) ; Cohn, "Criminal Records"-A Compar-
ative Approach, 4 GA. J. INT. d CowP. L. 116 (1974); Comment, Branded: Arrest
Records of the Unconvicted, 44 Miss. L. J. 928 (1973); Comment, Davidson v. Dill:
A Compelling State Interest in Retaining Arrest Records, 35 U. pITT. L. R1EV. 205
(1973) ; Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 850 (1971); Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due to
Arrest Records-Private Remedies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110 (1971); Gough, The Ex-
pungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem
of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 147.
nEddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (1971).
1975]
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A mere arrest, or an arrest followed by complete exoneration, may,
however, have a disastrous impact on an individual's life and career.
Perhaps the most sensitive area is employment. One survey by the
New York Civil Liberties Union showed that 75 percent of New York
area employment agencies refuse to refer an applicant with an arrest
record, regardless of disposition.3 6 Another survey, covering 75 employ-
ers, revealed that 66 of them would not consider an applicant who had
been acquitted of an assault charge.37
The possibilities for abuse of national criminal data are very nearly
staggering. The FBI's Identification Bureau has jurisdiction over arrest
records; and by federal statute, the Attorney General or officials ap-
pointed by him must:
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal
identification, crime and other records; and(2) exchange these records with and for the official use of, author-
ized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal
and other institutions.'
Rulings by the Attorney General interpreting the statutory author-
ity provide that the Director of the FBI shall:
Conduct the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification, and pres-
ervation of identification records, including personal fingerprints
voluntarily submitted, on a mutually beneficial basis, from law en-
forcement and other governmental agencies, insurance companies,
railroad police, national banks, member banks of the Federal Re-
serve System, FDIC-Reserve-Insured Banks, and banking institu-
tions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpor-
ation; provide expert testimony in Federal or local courts as to
fingerprint examinations; and provide identification assistance in
disasters and in missing persons type cases including those from
insurance companies.'
The FBI certainly does not disseminate such information to all
comers, but it is required by law to disseminate it to the agencies listed
above as well as to federal agencies for record checks on all prospective
federal employees.40 And, although the FBI may cancel the exchange
of records with an agency which allows improper dissemination, 41 it
MMenard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally Gough, supra
note 34 at 150-162.
8Id.
128 U.S.C. § 534 (a) (1964).
-28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (b) (1949-53 Comp.).
'
0Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-53 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964).
According to Menard v. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 722, the Civil Service Commission
and the military submit the largest number of fingerprints to the Identification
Bureau. The Bureau receives about 29,000 fingerprints a day, approximately 13,000
from law enforcement agencies concerning arrests and the remaining 16,000 from
other sources.
The Division, broadly speaking, considers any state, city or county official to be
authorized to receive information if the agency has something to do with law
enforcement or if it is authorized by statute, ordinance, or rules to fingerprint
applicants for employment or for a permit or license.
Id. at 721. The court in Menard included an appendix, "Sample of Persons re-
quired to be Fingerprinted by State or Local Statute, Ordinance or Rule":
"Glendale, Arizona:
Taxicab drivers . . . traveling merchants . . . solicitors or canvassers ....
[Vol. 36
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has no practical means to supervise or control the information once it
leaves the central file and has no sanctions beyond mere cancellation.42
It is naive to think that FBI or other law enforcement information
never reaches employers. A Massachusetts grand jury has recently been
investigating evidence that state police officers were selling police
records to private employers, 43 and one study revealed that employers
in St. Louis and Baltimore had regular access to police records. 44 In
New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and
Boston, such access apparently depended on the status of the employer;
it was reserved for the influential.45
Courts and legislatures are becoming more and more aware of the
potential harm to an individual from the mere fact of having an arrest
record. State v. Pinkney 46 involved an 18-year-old defendant who was
indicted for first degree murder. He was tried but the jury deadlocked;
and while he was awaiting retrial several months later, other people
confessed to the murder. He successfully petitioned to have all police
records pertaining to this arrest, including those in the possession of any
federal law enforcement agencies, expunged. The court said:
It is the opinion of this Court that there exists in the individual
a fundamental right of privacy, the right to be left alone. The
potential economic and personal harm that result if his arrest be-
comes known to employers, credit agencies or even neighbors, may
be catastrophic.'7
The court further quoted with approval from Menard v. Mitchell,4s
Denver, Colorado:
Any applicant for a driver's license.
District of Columbia:
Auctioneers . . . junk dealers, mediums, parking lot attendants, pawnbrokers,
second hand dealers . . . vendors . . . ABC licensees.
Town of Manalpan, Florida:
Every person employed in any club, any place handling liquor, beer or wine in
any form, motels, hotels, apartment houses, health spas, hospitals, and all
newspaper carriers over the age of sixteen years, service station employees . . .
nurses . . . town employees . . . and all domestic servants in the town.
Idaho:
All real estate salesmen and brokers.
Nevada:
Every applicant for a license to practice medicine.
North Carolina:
Applicants for admission to the Bar.
Provincetown, Massachusetts:
All non-residents seeking employment."
Id. at 728. The Menard court noted, however, that ''criminal record data is not sent
directly to private employers," except in a few defined instances. Id. at 722.
-'28 U.S.C. § 534 (b) (1964).
"Menard v. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 722.
1120 Couv. REc. S 1297 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974).
"Arrest Records-Protecting the Innocent, supra note 34 at 632. The same writer
records that, " [a] t least one major investigation agency has advertised police file
checks as part of its services." Id.
4Id.
"State v. Pinkney, 290 N.E.2d 923 (C.P. Ohio 1972).
'7Id. at 924.
"Menard v. Mitchell, supra note 36 at 490.
1975]
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a case in which the plaintiff, arrested for a crime which never occurred,
sued for expunging of his arrest records. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's
granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment and remanded
the case for trial.49 In remanding, the court said:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known,
may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct
economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation
may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both direct
and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or profes-
sional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence
of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or com-
plete exoneration of the charges involved.'
The court then explained other types of harm to the person with
an arrest record, even one who is totally innocent:
An arrest record may be used by the police in determining whether
subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or whether to exer-
cise their discretion to bring formal charges against an individual
already arrested. Arrest records have been used in deciding whether
to allow a defendant to present his story without impeachment by
prior convictions, and as a basis for denying release prior to trial or
an appeal; or they may be considered by a judge in determining the
sentence to be given a convicted offender. 1
Add to all of this the fact that at present few criminal justice
agencies are governed by statutes or rules requiring a periodic purge of
stale records,5 2 and it becomes appallingly clear that an arrest record,
by the mere fact of its existence, may hound a person, even an innocent
person, for the rest of his life.
BALANCING THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS:
PRIVACY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
It is obvious at this point that the public has two discrete, and to
some extent conflicting, interests in the controversy over the proper
handling and use of criminal records. On the one hand, we cannot ignore
the valid needs of law enforcement; on the other, we must preserve
'
9Menard v. Mitchell, supra note 1.
5 0Menard v. Mitchell, supra note 36 at 490.
T Id. at 490-491.
6For state statutes requiring return or destruction of all records of arrest upon
exoneration of the arestee, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-90 AVTGBQ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, § 206-5 (Smith-Hurd 1971); LA. R. S. 44:9 (1950), as amended,
Acts 1970, No. 445, § 1, Acts 1972, No. 715, §§ 2, 3; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.463
(1969). These statutes are all quite recent and provide varying degrees of protection.
Some states attempt to deal with the problem by restricting access to arrest records,
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-16 (1961) and ORE. REV. STAT. § 181.540
(1972). Others provide for return of fingerprints and photographs on dismissal of
a case or when a person with no prior convictions is acquitted. See, e.g., HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 28.54 (1968); MINN. STAT. A. § 646.40 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1405(c) (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-29(h) (1961).
At least two bills introduced into the United States Senate on Feb. 5, 1974,
would provide for purging or sealing of certain records at stated intervals. One is
Senator Sam Ervin's "The Criminal Justice Information Control and Protection of
Privacy Act of 1974"' (S. 2963, Section 206); the other is "The Criminal Justice
Information Systems Act of 1974" (S. 2964, Section 9), which was introduced by
Senator Roman Hruska at the request of the Attorney General.
[Vol. 36
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our hard-won personal liberties, not the least of which is "the right to
be let alone." We might also question the meaning of "innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" in an era of wide dissemination
of arrest records not followed by a plea or finding of guilty.
One of the most common justifications for the need to maintain all
arrest records, regardless of disposition, is that of identification and
apprehension of criminals.
[A]s a means for identification and apprehension of criminals, an
arrest record does serve the police community as a most valuable
tool. Nation, state and citywide crime detection and prevention are
based upon a system of information and communication. Statistical
experience tells them that persons with arrest records commit a
higher percentage of crimes than persons who do not have arrest
records.'
The Washington State court of appeals has pointed out, however,
that the usefulness of arrest records for purposes of crime prevention
and detection rests upon two assumptions: one, that the arrestee actually
committed the crime; and two, that his commission of that crime shows
that he is likely to commit other crimes in the future.5 4 If the arrestee
makes an affirmative showing of innocence, or if he is acquitted or
charges against him are dismissed, the first assumption may be totally
in error. The validity of the second assumption can be challenged if
the first is faulty, and also, independently, in that certain types of
criminal offenders tend to be repeaters and others do not. Thus, there
are many situations where retention of arrest records is useless for
purposes of detection and prevention of crime.
It has also been asserted that all arrest records must be kept
indefinitely for administrative reasons. In Spock v. District of Columbia,5
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals said that all arrest records
were necessary to prevent secret arrests, to be used in cases of alleged
police misconduct, and to serve the legislature in its future deliberations.
The answer to the problem of secret arrests would seem to be
that no one is suggesting that local arrest records not be made at all
or that they be purged prior to disposition of the case or before a
statutory interval for purging has run out.5 6 As to charges of police
misconduct, surely local purging statutes can be drawn to take into
account the date at which such claims would become stale. Finally, in
regard to the legislature's need for arrest data to draw future legis-
1 Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1969), citing FEDERA.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 35 (1967).
'Eddy v. Moore, supra note 35 at 217.
5Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14 (D.C. Ct.App. 1971).5 The real question in this comment is what should be allowed to go into the computer,
not what type of record information should be retained in local law enforcement
files. The latter is a separate and difficult question. States with purging or sealing
statutes seem not to have found this an insurmountable problem, however. See
authorities cited supra note 52.
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lation, it is both possible and sensible to preserve statistical data without
individual identifiers.
The problems of computerizing criminal data are, of course, much
greater than those pertaining specifically to arrest records. On the side
of law enforcement, instantaneous access to certain types of criminal
data is extremely useful to officers in the field. Project SEARCH 7
(SEARCH is an acronym for System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval
of Criminal Histories) points out:
[I]n most police "on scene" investigations where possible suspects
are involved, the officer requires immediate knowledge of prior
record to aid in making decisions regarding search, detention, or
arrest.
Given factual knowledge of the occurrence of a crime and that the
suspect was in the vicinity, the law enforcement officer's aim is to
obtain sufficient information to determine the extent to which fur-
ther police investigation should be conducted. For this purpose, it is
necessary to quickly supply the investigator with sufficient data to
pursue the case in an intelligent manner. Further information about
the suspect is vital knowledge for the officer charged with arresting
the subject; for example, does he have a record of violent behavior
or of using lethal weapons ?'
SEARCH further notes that such information would help police deter-
mine: (1) the proper charge; (2) whether to issue a summons instead
of making an arrest; (3) court jurisdiction; (4) whether the subject
should be released on bail; (5) the subject's current criminal justice
status (e.g., if he's already on bail, on probation or parole, and the like).+9
However, much of the data which SEARCH60 would gather into a
computer system, under its proposed Model State Act for Criminal Of-
fender Record Information, is extremely sensitive. It includes:
[R]ecords and data compiled by criminal justice agencies for pur-
poses of identifying criminal offenders and of maintaining as to each
such offender a summary of arrests, pretrial proceedings, the nature
and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, rehabilitation and
release."
This presents a whole range of privacy and security problems, not the
least of which is the problem of using arrest records of exonerated
persons in any of the ways mentioned above.62 Also, though such in-
formation may be useful, there are many situations where a person's
past criminal record should not be used. For example, a person's past
record should rarely be an important factor in determining probable
"SEARCH started in June, 1969. Its purpose was to develop a prototype computerized
criminal data system; and it was funded by L.E.A.A., see text supra note 6, and
participating states. See, Project SEARCH Security and Privacy Publications, May
1973, Part I: Security and Privacy Considerations in Criminal History Information
Systems, at 1, and Part III, Model Administrative Regulations for Criminal Offender
Record Information, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Project SEARCH].
"Project SEARCH, supra note 57, Part I at 2.
51Id. One of the reasons SEARCH sees need for computerized inter- and intra-state
criminal data systems is the mobility of the criminal population. Id. at 3.
"Project SEARCH, supra note 57, Part II.
6id. at 15.
"See text accompanying notes 58 and 59, supra.
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cause. 63 Yet it is quite possible that once such information is abundantly
and easily available, it will be used improperly-even by generally well-
intentioned and consciencious officers-simply because it is there.64
In addition, system security is no less a problem in criminal data
systems than in other systems containing sensitive information. Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal at length with sys-
tem security, a few points should be made.
First, though it is possible to develop a system which is technolog-
ically very secure, this is extremely expensive65-so expensive that per-
haps only the military can afford it. Also, though the hardware and
software may be secure, there is always the human factor. Careful
screening of key persons allowed in the central processing area is both
possible and desirable, but what of the thousands of remote access term-
inals across the country and the tens of thousands of persons who can
and will operate them ?66
We should also keep in mind that we are not considering a manual
system where an interested party, even if he should get improper access
to sensitive files, would be limited as to the amount and quality of
available data.6 7 A national network of interfacing criminal data com-
puters offers, with a single and relatively brief access to only one term-
inal, huge quantities of high-quality information. Because of this, it
may be worth the while of certain wealthy and powerful organizations
to bend their efforts toward learning what the computer knows.68
There is clearly a need to balance the competing public interests
in effective law enforcement and individual privacy. The 1972 Montana
Constitution provides a mandate in this regard, for it contains, in Article
II, Section 10, an explicit, general right of privacy.
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compel-
ling state interest.
1A past record, combined with many other factors, might help to establish ''reasonable
cause to suspect," as the term is used in R.C.M. 1947, § 95-719, Montana's Stop and
Frisk statute, thus allowing brief detention for further investigation. Standing
alone, however, a past record establishes nothing about present conduct.
"The likelihood of this can be cited to lack of education or sensitivity to the destruc-
tive potential of such uses, the inability to overcome temptation, mutual backscratch-
ing, and the like. See discussion, supra note 43-45 and note 25.
6MILLER, supra note 3 at 242.
wIn 1971 there were from 7,000 to 8,000 agencies participating in information ex-
change with the FBI's Identification Division, of which about 3,750 were local law
enforcement agencies. Menard v. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 721. Senator Ervin noted
that when the N.C.I.C. computerized criminal data system is "fully operational,"
about 40,000 state and local police agencies will be tied into it. 120 CoNG. REc.
S 1296 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974).
0See discussion, supra note 20, comparing manual with computerized data systems.
'This could include large corporations seeking information on employees, potential
employees, and persons with whom they do business, not to mention large-scale crimi-
nal organizations, for which such data would be a veritable gold mine.
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This provision is evidently unique among American constitutions,69
and its contours have yet to be interpreted and defined by the Montana
supreme court.7 One thing seems certain, however; Section 10, by the
use of the "compelling state interest" language, was intended to elevate
the right of privacy in Montana to the status of a fundamental con-
stitutional right.
71
Thus, the proper test for any state proposal involving collection
and dissemination of personal data would seem to be whether the state
can carry its burden of showing that the proposal is "necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy. '72 That is:
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling."
Several state courts have recently applied the compelling state
interest test to arrest record cases. In Eddy v. Moore,7' Harriet Eddy
sued for return of her photographs and fingerprints from the Seattle
Police Department after assault charges against her were dismissed at
trial. The court held that she was entitled to their return, noting:
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling showing
of necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints and
photographs upon an acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and that it is as well within the penumbras
of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights "formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)."
The court found that the government had not shown any compelling
necessity, adding:
"The United States Constitution contains no explicit right of privacy, though such a
right has been found to exist, with roots in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Four-
teenth Amendments, and in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. , 93 S. Ct. 705, 726 (1973). Although certain recently enacted state
constitutions do recognize such a right, it seems always to be embedded in a general
Fourth Amendment-type of Search and Seizure provision, thus casting doubt on its
efficacy to provide a "general" right of privacy. See, e.g., 1968 Maryland Con-
stitution, art. 1, § 1.05; 1968 Hawaii Constitution, art. 1, § 5; 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution, art. 1, § 6.7 The greatest unsettled question is whether Section 10 protects against invasions of
privacy by private persons or whether it is directed only against governmental in-
vasions. Though extremely interesting and important, this question is beyond the
scope of this comment, because in regard to computerized criminal data systems,
we are clearly dealing with state action.
nUnder federal constitutional law, "fundamental rights" are accorded a preferred
and exceptional status. The United States Supreme Court has held that, "regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake," Roe v. Wade, supra note 69 at 728. Use of the "compelling
state interest" language in Section 10 suggests that this is the standard by which
state invasions of individual privacy are to be tested.
72McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
nBates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
7 Eddy v. Moore, supra note 35.
NId. at 217.
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We do not believe requiring law enforcement agencies to show a com-
pelling necessity for retention of fingerprints and photographs of
acquitted persons places an undue burden on them.8
To reach its holding, the court balanced "a right of privacy in the finger-
prints and photographs of an accused who has been acquitted . . .
against the claim of the state for a need for their retention."
77
Davidson v. Dill,75 involved a similar suit by Dorothy Davidson,
who was arrested for loitering in Denver, Colorado, and was subsequently
acquitted at a trial by jury. She sought alternative relief, either expung-
ing or return of her arrest records. The trial court dismissed her com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Colorado supreme court reversed and remanded for trial on the
merits, noting:
The issue presented is complex and involves the balancing of the
state's interest in efficient law enforcement procedures as against a
particular citizen's right to be let alone.'
In deciding to remand, the court found persuasive a group of cases
holding that:
[A] court should expunge an arrest record or order its return when
the harm to the individual's right of privacy or dangers of unwar-
ranted adverse consequences outweigh the public interest in retaining
the records in police files.'
One commentator points out that a constitutional right of privacy
is an affirmative right and is thus far more than a mere right of each
acquitted individual to sue for expungement of records pertaining to
his arrest.8 ' It is in fact an a priori check on the power of the state to
keep records containing personal data, or to disseminate those records,
unless the state can show a compelling necessity.
Davidson and Eddy were each based on a state court's finding of
a paramount right of privacy without the aid of an explicit, general
privacy provision in the state's constitution. In Montana, where both
the right of privacy and the compelling state interest test are of explicit
constitutional status, surely the right can be no less. Thus, there is need
to examine any Montana proposal involving collection, retention, and
dissemination of personal data with great caution.
PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL DATA COMPUTER: PROPOSALS
The following proposals are an attempt to reconcile the competing
public interests in law enforcement and privacy, in regard to a central-
ized Montana criminal data computer system, which will eventually be
7 Id. at 218.
71d. at 217.
"Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (1972).
7id. at 162-162.
MId. at 161.
"Davidson v. Dill: A Compelling State Interest in Retaining Arrest Records, supra
note 34 at 215.
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interfaced with other state and federal systems. The proposals also
attempt to take in to full account the state's need to show a compelling
necessity at every step of the data handling process, including collection,
use, retention, and dissemination.
I. JUVENILE DATA EXCLUDED
No information shall be entered concerning juvenile offenders. Many
states, including Montana, require such information to be kept largely
confidential, believing that this contributes to the rehabilitation of the
youthful offender.82
II. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION EXCLUDED
No intelligence, analytical, or investigative information shall be entered.
The intent here is to exclude unverified data, such as tips, rumors, unsub-
stantiated allegations, conjecture, and subjective evaluations. Only veri-
fied information of public record derived from official criminal justice
proceedings may be entered."
III. SPECIFIED MISDEMEANORS EXCLUDED
No information on misdemeanor drunk or traffic arrests shall be
entered. Other minor misdemeanors should also be excluded, and this
is a topic for further study.
8 4
IV. DISPOSITION REQUIRED
No arrest data shall be entered until coupled with a disposition. Only
dispositions indicating guilt are of legitimate use to law enforcement, 5
particularly in light of Montana's constitutional privacy provisons.8 6 In
addition, a person arrested on the type of crime permitted into the com-
puter will generally be in custody or under bail pending trial. Thus,
there is no general need for raw arrest information to be entered. If an
offender flees the jurisdiction to avoid trial, he then may be entered
under the heading of "wanted persons. '8 7 This provision also solves the
problem of agencies whose files contain great numbers of arrest entries
without dispositions and who are faced with an enormous practical
problem of obtaining dispositions.8 "
V. CONVICTION REQUIRED
Only arrest records followed by a finding or plea of guilty shall be
entered. As noted elsewhere in this comment, dispositions of acquittal
"Project SEARCH, supra note 57, Part I at 16-17, excludes juvenile data for this
reason. Montana's 1974 Youth Court Act, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 10-1230 (law enforcement
records), 10-1231 (youth court records), and 10-1232 (disposition of records), pro-
vide for restriction of records involving juvenile offenders until they reach maturity
and then for sealing.
8Project SEARCH, supra note 57, Part 1 at 17, suggests this exclusion.
"See discussion, supra notes 35 and 54.
"See discussion, supra notes 69-71.
81See discussion, infra notes 91-92.
18See supra note 33.
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or exoneration have little legitimate use in law enforcement and cannot
pass the compelling state interest test.s"
VI. ORIGINAL ENTRY
If an arrest record and disposition may properly be entered, that
data must be accompanied by other available data on pretrial proceedings,
sentence, rehabilitation, and release. Such data not available at the time
of the original entry shall be entered when it becomes available. [Such a
file shall be designated a "criminal history."]90 This is to assure that a
"criminal history" is as complete as possible at any given time.
VII. IDENTIFICATION INFORIIATION
"Identification information"91 may be entered only (a) upon proper
original entry of a "criminal history," or (b) on "wanted persons."
"Wanted" shall mean, on certain designated serious felonies,9 2 the person
is at large and probable cause exists for arrest, such as where a warrant
of arrest has issued. "Identification information" is necessary upon orig-
inal entry to establish the identity of the offender whom the original
data concerns, as well as subsequent data. This provision is intended
to restrict the "identification information" in the computer to that for
which a compelling necessity can be shown. It is also intended to require
that once a "wanted" person is apprehended, the "identification infor-
mation" is purged and the computer will contain no more data on him
unless and until proper entry can be made under (a).
VIII. FINGERPRINT REQUIREMENTS
No "criminal history" data may be entered unless accompanied by a
fingerprint card bearing designated fingerprints of the data subject. This
is necessary to insure proper identification of the subject and all data
pertaining to himY5
'See discussion, supra notes 35, 54, and 71-81.
This label is used here only for convenience.
"Project SEARCH suggests the following identifiers: "full name, date and place
of birth, sex, occupation, race, height, weight, hair color, features, skin tone, identi-
fying marks, FBI number, social security number, any operator 's license number,
any miscellaneous identifying numbers." Project SEARCH comments:
It should be understood that Social Security and other identifying numbers
are included . . . in order to complete or verify individual identifications,
and not as a device to permit linkages or data sharing with other informa-
tion systems.
Project SEARCH, supra note 57, Part I at 16. Privacy-sensitive individuals may well
wonder how adequate is SEARCH's disclaimer of "linkages or data sharing" by
use of social security and other such numbers, in view of the "computer convenience"
of such sharing. MILLER, supra note 3 at 60-61.
"There are many possible designations. For example: (a) only serious felonies in-
volving violence against persons; (b) only serious felonies involving violence against
persons or property; (c) a list of serious felonies by name which are to be included,
such as intentional homicide, sexual intercourse without consent, aggravated assault,
kidnapping, and the like.
'Fingerprints remain the best positive identifier. See generally TAsK FORCE REPORT:
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 32 at 77.
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IX. ACCESS LI\iITATIONS
Access to computer information shall be limited to (a) designated
law enforcement agencies, (b) approved criminal justice research projects,
and (c) the data subject or his properly designated representative. This
is intended to place strict controls upon who can obtain the computer
information. It might be wise under (a) to establish classes of agencies
to receive particular types of information. 4 Under (b), strict regulations
should be drawn to control what types of research projects may be
approved, how they are to be approved, and strict security controls
provided if personally identifiable data is to be used. In general, re-
search projects should require only statistical data.95 Provision (c) is
necessary for instances in which the data subject is unable to appear or
act on his own behalf.9 6
X. NOTIFICATION To DATA SUBJECT
The data subject shall be notified at the time of original entry of his
"criminal history": (a) of the fact that such entry has been made; (b)
of the significance of such entry, including but not limited to classes of
persons to whom it may be disseminated, interfacing computer systems
through which it may be accessed, and use to be made of it; (c) of the
specific, exact and complete contents of his "criminal history"; (d) of his
right annually to request and receive an updated copy of his "criminal
history"; (e) of his right to challenge inaccurate, incomplete, misleading,
or stale data, and the remedies available, including correction, addition,
deletion, or total purging of such data; (f) of the method of challenge and
of appeal from an adverse decision; (g) of the person responsible, within
the agency which controls the central processing unit, for accuracy of the
data; (h) of the remedies for violation of his right of privacy; and (i)
of the statutory intervals for agency purging of specific types of data.
This notification shall be mailed to the data subject's last known address.
Ideally at this time the subject should receive both a pamphlet contain-
ing, in very clear and simple language, the standard information out-
lined above, and a print-out of his own "criminal history." The purpose
of this is to provide him with the information he needs to protect his
own rights.97
XI. PURGING
(a) If a subject with a felony conviction has been free from criminal
justice supervision for seven years without any subsequent convictions
of a nature to be entered in this system, if no prosecution is pending
"Sen. Ervin's bill, S. 2963, supra note 52, classifies data and data users. In Montana,
because of the relative cost and smallness of the system, this might not be practical.
If care is taken to restrict what types of data go into the system, it should also
not be necessary.
'SIt is possible that a few worthy projects might need to follow up on particular
offenders, as, for example, to study rehabilitation. Most projects requiring individual
identification should require consent of those individuals, however; and adequate
privacy protections should be provided.
[Vol. 36
17
Uda: Privacy, Law Enforcement, And Public Interest: Computerized Criminal Records
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1975
COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL RECORDS
against him, and if he is not a fugitive from justice at the end of that
time, his "criminal history" shall be purged. (b) If a subject with a
misdemeanor conviction meets the same criteria for a period of four years,
his "criminal history" shall be purged. s This provision would remove
all data from the system on individuals who meet the criteria. It would
be effective, however, only if coupled with provisions for purging other
systems which have accessed the data, provisions which should be speci-
fied in intersystem agreements for exchange or interfacing.9 Also, pro-
visions must be made to notify agencies which have received print-outs
of the data, of a) the purging, and (b) the significance of the purging.
Otherwise, the purging may be meaningless.'0 0 In addition, further study
should be given to the question of whether these provisions should apply
only to persons with single offenses or to persons with extensive records
as well. It may be that the "redemption factor" applies equally or even
more to the repeating offender who actually rehabilitates himself. It
is also possible, however, that a clear record for a number of years means
only that the repeating offender has gained expertise at avoiding deten-
tion or conviction. Perhaps type of offense should be considered as well,
since some types of offense are known to have a high likelihood of
repetition, while others do not. It may be that a provision could be
drawn automatically purging data in (b) regardless of prior misde-
meanor offenses, but giving some agency discretion in (a) for subjects
with specified types of prior offenses.
XII. NEGATIVE ANSWERS To INQUIRES
After data is purged, the data subject may answer all inquiries about
his criminal record, whether governmental or otherwise, as if the purged
offense had never occurred.1 1 This would require that the data subject
know of the purging; and provision should be made for official explana-
tion to anyone who, knowing of the record before purging, legitimately
questions such an answer.
XIII. RECORDS OF ACCESS
The agency which controls the central processing unit shall keep
"Access by the data subject to his own file might also require use of fingerprints for
positive identification.
'The greatest problem with this approach is that it places most of the burden of
protecting these rights upon the individual offender, who is frequently not well-
educated and is often indigent. Means should be found to ameliorate this burden as
much as is reasonably possible.
I" 'Purge' means to remove information from the records of . . . a criminal justice
information system so that there is no trace of information removed and no indica-
tion that such information was removed.'' S. 2963, supra note 52, Title I, § 102 (17).
'It is an open question whether other systems will agree to this or will have statutory
authority to negotiate such matters.
10°Objection may be raised that this, like many of the suggestions in this comment,
will be costly and will substantially increase the total expense of the program. Rights
are frequently expensive to maintain. The alternative is to risk losing them.
101A number of commentators suggest this approach. See, e.g., The Expungement or
Restriction of Arrest Records, supra note 34 at 125.
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records of all computer accesses. This is necessary for purposes such as
purging and control of improper access.' 2
XIV. SYSTEM AND PERSONNEL SECURITY
Regulations must be established for security of the central processing
unit and of the remote access terminals and for screening and training of
all persons who operate such units.10I
XV. REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
Criminal penalties and civil remedies must be established for viola-
tions and must be substantial enough to serve as deterrants. Civil remedies
should include both actual and punitive damages and should be awarded
whenever possible with an eye to returning the plaintiff to his situation
before the violation. Further study is needed on specific provisions and
on the question of negligent as opposed to intentional violations. 0 4
XVI. AMINISTRATION
A privacy board should be established to set policy, make regulations,
conduct hearings, and the like. Again, further study is needed on ques-
tions such as: whether there should be one body or two (some proposals
suggest both a policy-making body and an administrative body) ;105
what specific powers the body or bodies should have, and whether these
powers should be determined by statute or referred to Montana's gen-
eral provisions for administrative procedure ;106 and under which state
department the body or bodies should operate. 0 7
CONCLUSION
The above proposals are intended to highlight areas of concern and
to suggest a possible scheme for balancing important conflicting interests.
They are not meant to be models for legislative enactment, nor do they
exhaust all problems or issues. Many of them are sure to be controversial,
to partisans on both sides of the conflict.
112S. 2963, supra note 52, Title II, Sec. 206(d) would require that this be done.
"0See generally, MILLER, supra note 3 at 239-257.
1S. 2963, supra note 52, Title III, Sec. 309, provides for maximum criminal penalties
of $5,000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both, for '"willful" dissemination, main-
tenance, or use of such information. Sec. 308(e) provides for civil penalties, including
a $100 fine for each violation plus actual and general damages, costs, and reasonable
attorneys' fees, and for exemplary and punitive damages in specified instances. The
civil action is only available after exhaustion of administrative remedies.
' Project SEARCH, supra note 57, Part II at 16-19; S. 2963, supra note 52, Title III,
Sections 301, 302, and 304.
-R.C.M. 1947, Title 82, Ch. 42, Administrative Procedure Act.
"'
7Montana's Executive Reorganization Act, R.C.M. 1947, § 82A-104, provides that all
"executive and administrative offices, boards, commissions, agencies, and instru-
mentalities of the executive branch of state government" must operate under the
auspices of one of nineteen enumerated departments. On inspection of this list, it
is not immediately obvious where a privacy board or commission should be attached.
It is doubtful that it should be attached to the Department of Justice, since an im-
portant and continuing function would be balancing individual privacy rights against
the needs of law enforcement; and with such an attachment, the balance could be lost.
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It is imperative that thoughtful attention be paid to these issues,
because carelessly drafted legislation which loses the balance can, and
predictably will, create a monster. Perhaps the ideal is to do nothing
at all; that would surely be better than drifting casually into a "record
prison" society, a process which is already well underway. 08
As Montana prepares to enter a computerized criminal history sys-
tem, her citizens would do well to keep alert. As Senator Sam Ervin
has commented, freedom, unguarded, slips easily away, and the time for
concern is now.
Privacy, like many of the other attributes of freedom, can be easiest
appreciated when it no longer exists. A complacent citizenry only
becomes outraged about its loss of integrity and individuality when
the aggrandizement of power in the Government becomes excessive.
By then, it may be too late .... Nor should we wait until there is
such a threat before we address this problem. Protecting against the
loss of a little liberty is the best means of safeguarding ourselves
against the loss of all our freedom.'
"$See generally MILLER, supra note 3, and Westin, supra note 18.
1120 CONG. REC. S 1295 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1974).
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